quarta-feira, 7 de maio de 2014

Economia autista

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Como para o autista Krugman (e praticamente todos como Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffrey Sachs, David Romer, Nouriel Roubini, etc) o que só importa é o crescimento e não outros padrões como demografia, cultura, sociedade, meio ambiente, ele está “conscientemente” pregando que o crescimento elevado deveria ser eterno, exponencial ao infinito, algo que só as bactérias e vírus perseguem num espaço finito.  É de uma estupidez tamanha que a grande surpresa não é ser proferida, mas seguida por todos.

A estagnação, concentração de riqueza, crises, falta de empregos, colapso planetário deve estar relacionada com outros fatores que escapam das análises dos economistas, por isso, eles nunca irão acertar, enquanto a análise continuar míope e restrita ao seu campo limitado de visão.

Esse vídeo ilustra bem como os economistas pensam

Description: Paul Krugman - New York Times Blog
May 7, 4:25 am Comment

Three Charts on Secular Stagnation

  •  Apologies for blog silence — stuff happened. Right now I’m in Oxford, preparing for a talk tonight on secular stagnation and all that; and I thought I’d share three charts I find helpful in thinking about where we are.
Secular stagnation is the proposition that periods like the last five-plus years, when even zero policy interest rates aren’t enough to restore full employment, are going to be much more common in the future than in the past — that the liquidity trap is becoming the new normal. Why might we think that?
One answer is simply that this episode has gone on for a long time. Even if the Fed raises rates next year, which is far from certain, at that point we will have spent 7 years — roughly a quarter of the time since we entered a low-inflation era in the 1980s — at the zero lower bound. That’s vastly more than the 5 percent or less probability Fed economists used to consider reasonable for such events.
Beyond that, it does look as if it was getting steadily harder to get monetary traction even before the 2008 crisis. Here’s the Fed funds rate minus core inflation, averaged over business cycles (peak to peak; I treat the double-dip recession of the early 80s as one cycle):
Description: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2014/05/07/opinion/050714krugman1/050714krugman1-blog480.png
And this was true even though there was clearly unsustainable debt growth, especially during the Bush-era cycle:
Description: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2014/05/07/opinion/050714krugman2/050714krugman2-blog480.png
The point is that even if deleveraging comes to an end, even stabilizing household debt relative to GDP would involve spending almost 4 percent of GDP less than during the 2001-7 business cycle.
Finally, the growth of potential output is very likely to be much slower in the future than in the past, if only because of demography:
Description: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2014/05/07/opinion/050714krugman3/050714krugman3-blog480.png
Suppose that potential growth is one percentage point slower, and that the capital-output ratio is 3. In that case, slowing potential growth would, other things being equal, reduce investment demand by 3 percent of GDP.
So if you take the end of the credit boom and the slowing of potential growth together, we have something like a 7 percent of GDP anti-stimulus relative to the 2001-7 business cycle — a business cycle already characterized by low real rates and a close brush with the liquidity trap.
Predictions are hard, especially about the future — but as I see it, these charts offer very good reasons to worry that secular stagnation is indeed quite likely.

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